I. INTRODUCTION
In Bruton v. United States, 1 principles of domestic evidence law, namely the federal hearsay rule, prohibited the prosecution from using the confession of codefendant Evans as evidence against defendant Bruton.
2 Evans did not take the stand and was unavailable for cross-examination by Bruton's counsel. 3 The trial court admitted the confession as evidence against Evans. 4 It instructed the jury to disregard the confession in determining Bruton's guilt or innocence. 5 Under these circumstances, the United States Supreme Court found a violation of Bruton's sixth amendment right to "be confronted with the witnesses" against him, reasoning that the limit-the Supreme Court suggested that each jurisdiction can shape its own rules of evidence to admit some codefendant confessions as evidence against a defendant, under an exception to the hearsay rule, and still not be deemed guilty of a Confrontation Clause violation, even where the defendant has no opportunity to cross-examine the confessing codefendant. 9 Approximately one-half of all American jurisdictions, nevertheless, still do not recognize a hearsay exception which would allow the prosecution to use, under certain circumstances, a codefendant's confession as evidence against his or her fellow defendant.' 0 In the legal vernacular, these jurisdictions 6 Id. at 137. See infra text accompanying notes 39-45 (concerning Bruton's essential premise that, under domestic law, the confession of codefendant Evans was inadmissible hearsay as to the defendant Bruton.)
In Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 542 (1986) , the Court agreed that a Bruton issue arises only because of the unwillingness or inability ofjuries to adhere to limiting instructions, saying, " [T] his is not strictly speaking a Bruton case because we are not here concerned with the effectiveness of limiting instructions in preventing spill-over prejudice to a defendant when his codefendant's confession is admitted against the codefendant at a joint trial." However, Bruton is not applicable to bench trials. See generally Haddad,
Post-Bruton Developments: A Reconsideration of the Confrontation Rationale, and a Proposalfor a Due Process Evaluation of Limiting Instructions, 18
Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 26-28 (1980) (argu- ing that Bruton is inapplicable to bench trials); cf. Garcia, The Winding Path of Bruton v. United States: A Case of Doctrinal Inconsistency, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 401, 402 n.8 (1988) (suggesting that issue is open). See also People v. Moore, 128 Ill. App. 3d 505, 514, 470 N.E.2d 1284 App. 3d 505, 514, 470 N.E.2d , 1290 App. 3d 505, 514, 470 N.E.2d -91 (1984 (when trier of fact is trialjudge, denial of motion for severance does not deprive defendant of fair trial). But see People v. Schmitt, 173 Ill. App. 3d 66, 92-93, 527 N.E.2d 384, 400 (1988) (Bruton applied to joint nonjury trial), rev 'd, 131 Ill. 2d 128, 545 N.E.2d 665 (1989) .
Nor does Bruton apply where the confessing defendant testifies and is available for cross-examination by the codefendant. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971) . See also infra text accompanying notes 126-134. Finally, the codefendant's statement must have implicated the defendant for Bruton to apply. See generally Haddad, supra at 20-25 (noting the decided cases and criticizing some applications of this limitation). See also infra note 12.
7 400 U. S. 74 (1970) . See infra text accompanying notes 51-57. 8 476 U. S. 530 (1986) . See infra text accompanying notes 71-82. 9 Dutton, 400 U.S. at 80-83; Lee, 476 U.S. at 543. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Dutton, suggested that states could engage in a "wholesale avoidance" of Bruton by allowing a codefendant's admissions to be used as evidence against a defendant. 400 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S Evi-DENCE § 804(b)(3)(03), at 804-151-52 (1975) .
10 Before adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions followed the English rule prohibiting the use of declarations against penal interest. See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 278 (3d ed. 1984 ) (discussing the Sussex Peerage case, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 Rep. (1844 , which rejected the use of an exculpatory declaration against penal interest). The rare inroads made against this prohibition usually involved declarations against interest offered by the defense inculpating the declarant and exculpating the defendant. See, e.g., People v. Letterich, 413 Ill. 2d 172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952) , and other cases cited by MCCORMICK, supra at 823 n.7. The do not recognize a hearsay exception permitting the use of "thirdparty inculpatory declarations against penal interest."
A hypothetical example illustrates the concern of this article. Assume that state X has jointly charged Able and Baker with murder. Under police interrogation, Able had given a full confession of his own role while also implicating Baker. Assume further that, under the applicable United States Supreme Court precedents, Able's accusations against Baker are deemed sufficiently reliable, so that state X's admission of Able's confession as evidence against Baker would not violate the Confrontation Clause, even though Baker has no opportunity to cross-examine Able. Assume, however, that state X has no hearsay exception allowing Able's confession to be used as evidence against Baker.
The issue discussed in this article is now posed: can the state of X put Able and Baker on trial jointly and admit Able's confession, including those portions which implicate Baker, while instructing the jury not to consider Able's confession as evidence against Baker? Or does such a procedure violate the Confrontation Clause where Able does not testify and is unavailable for crossexamination?
In such a case, prosecutors might argue that if the Confrontation Clause would permit state X to instruct the jury to use Able's confession as evidence against Baker, then the courts logically canfew instances where prosecutors successfully introduced declarations against interest typically involved situations where in the case against A, the prosecution was required to establish that someone other than A committed an offense, for example, in accountability cases or possession of stolen property cases. See infra note 12.
The Federal Rules of Evidence permit the use of both exculpatory and inculpatory declarations against penal interest. If the declarant is "unavailable," as defined in Rule 804(a), then under FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3), a hearsay exception exists where:
A statement which ... at the time of its making ... so far tended to subject the declarant to ... criminal liability ... that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. [Such (a)] statement ... offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). Nevertheless, approximately six "Federal Rules" states continue to exclude inculpatory declarations against penal interest. G. JOSEPH & S. not find a Confrontation Clause violation where state X instructs the jury not to use Able's confession as evidence against Baker, even if the jury is likely to disregard the limiting instruction. The prosecutors would assert that a defacto use cannot violate the Confrontation Clause where the same clause would permit a dejure use.
We conclude that as long as confrontation rather than procedural fairness remains the rationale for the Bruton result, such a prosecutorial argument should succeed. Under such circumstances, a trial judge should be required neither to sever Able's trial from Baker's trial nor to find some other solution to the Bruton problem, such as redacting Able's confession to exclude all references to Baker.' I This is so even if, applying the state X hearsay prohibition, the trial judge will exclude Able's confession as evidence against Baker, while using a limiting instruction of the very type deemed constitutionally inadequate in Bruton.
Such a conclusion would revolutionize Bruton doctrine in jurisdictions which recognize no hearsay exception for third-party inculpatory declarations against interest. It would add a new and complex level of analysis to every codefendant confession case in which an accused has advanced an otherwise meritorious Bruton claim. 12 Where domestic law prohibits use of a codefendant's con-11 Concerning possible alternatives to severance, see infra note 87. 12 In Bruton situations, courts are concerned about the "collateral" portion of a declaration against interest. For example, when A says, "I fired the gun while B stood lookout," the reference to B's conduct is collateral to the declaration against interest. That portion is not truly against the declarant's interest. Those who would admit the collateral portion of declarations against interest suggest that the declarant against interest is in a truth-telling mood so that his or her entire statement is normally reliable. See J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1465 (Chadbourn Rev. 1974 ) (discussion in context of declarations against pecuniary interest). Compare Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1, 60-61 (1944) (noting that Wigmore's rationale logically would require admission of those portions of a codefendant's confession which implicate a defendant, a result which ProfessorJefferson assumed was totally unacceptable and which Wigmore himself did not urge-see J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1477 , at 290, § 1076 , at 116 (3d ed. 1940 ). In some instances, third-party declarations are "non-collateral." For example, A's admission, "I stole the television," would be relevant to B's prosecution for possession of stolen property even though it directly implicates A. This is because the state has to establish in B's prosecution that the property in question was stolen. Similarly, where B is alleged to be accountable for A's act of arson, A's declaration, "I set fire to the building," can be very probative where B denies that the fire was of human origin. Courts have held that in such situations Bruton is inapplicable because the declarant has not accused the defendant. See generally Haddad, supra note 6, at 20-25 (providing a discussion of the cases and a criticism of this limitation). See also Rawls v. Patton, 585 F. Supp. 181, 187 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (noting debate over whether Bruton should apply where the codefendant's statement harms the defendant by admitting that a crime was committed but does not implicate the defendant in the crime). Some states, even those without a general declaration against penal interest hearsay exception, have recognized hearsay fession as evidence against a defendant, courts resolving Bruton claims would have to determine whether the Confrontation Clause would have permitted such a use. 1 3 The time and energy needed to evaluate the prosecution's contention provide one reason for courts to mandate severance under a procedural fairness theory where Bruton's confrontation rationale would permit utilization of an ineffective limiting instruction at ajoint trial. More importantly, courts should require severance under a procedural fairness rationale to prevent an inadequate limiting instruction procedure from subverting ajurisdiction's rules of evidence by permitting jury consideration of a codefendant's inadmissible hearsay accusation against a defendant.
II.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE ANOMALY

A. DOUGLAS AND BRUTON
A common misconception is that Bruton interpreted the Confrontation Clause so as to prohibit the use of a codefendant's confession or admission as evidence against a defendant. 14 This exceptions permitting use of certain "non-collateral" third-person declarations against interest. See, e.g 13 See infra text accompanying notes 148-149. Theoretically, if the conclusion reached in the article is correct, even in jurisdictions which have a declaration against penal interest exception to the rule against hearsay, a court which concluded that a particular accusation did not fit within the domestic law exception would have to determine whether use of that statement would violate the Confrontation Clause in order to determine whether Bruton requires severance. However, the authors know of no decision where a court in such ajurisdiction has concluded that the state hearsay analysis yields a different result than the federal confrontation analysis. Where prosecutors have offered declarations against penal interest, courts in such jurisdictions usually have assumed that the requirements for domestic law admissibility are identical to the requirements under the Confrontation Clause. They often have done so by reading into Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) a requirement of corroboration for inculpatory declarations against penal interest. See S. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULEs OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 804, at 966-68 (4th ed. 1986 ). See also State v. Myren, 133 Wis. 2d 430, 435, 395 N.W.2d 818, 821 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986 ) (hearsay analysis is "academic"); United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092 , 1100 (5th Cir. 1981 ), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834 (1982 (" [Wjhere the confrontation clause is implicated, it will tend inevitably to place the threshold of admissibility under the applicable hearsay exception at a level that will pass constitutional muster"). Contra People v. Rios, 163 Cal. App. 3d 852, 866, 210 Cal. Rptr. 271, 279 (1985) (raising possibility, in dictum, that California hearsay exception might be satisfied but that Confrontation Clause would be violated). Sess. 21-22 (1974) , which asserted that "Bruton held that the admission of the extrajudicial hearsay statement of one co-defendant violated "sloppy reading"' 5 of Bruton might explain why courts and commentators have focused little attention upon the issue discussed in this paper. If the proposition were true, this issue would not arise.
When Bruton was before the Court in 1968, many people may have assumed that use of a codefendant's confession as evidence against a defendant would violate the Confrontation Clause. Three years earlier, while applying the clause to state prosecutions for the first time, the Supreme Court in Pointer v. Texas 1 6 had declared that "the right of cross-examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witness against him."' 17 In fact, however, the Bruton Court avoided the question of whether the Confrontation Clause would have prohibited the use of the Evans' statements as evidence against Bruton.1 8 Instead, the decision rested upon the explicit assumption that under domestic law, the confession of 'codefendant Evans was inadmissible against defendant Bruton. 1 9 The Bruton story began in 1965 with Douglas v. Alabama, 20 decided the same day as Pointer. In Douglas the prosecutor, in the presence of the jury, had read aloud the confession of a separately tried accomplice, under the guise of examining the accomplice. 2 ' The accomplice had refused to answer questions, invoking his privilege against self-incrimination. 22 The Supreme Court held that the defendant's inability to cross-examine his alleged accomplice concerning the out-of-court accusations "plainly" denied Douglas "the right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause."
23
Although the reading of the confession and the refusal to answer questions "were not technically testimony," '2 4 the denial of an opportunity to cross-examine the accomplice violated the Confrontation Clause because "the jury might improperly infer both that the The Bruton Court later observed that Douglas had involved "circumstances analogous" to Bruton's case. 2 7 George Bruton and William Evans were convicted by a jury in a joint trial on a federal charge of armed postal robbery. 28 A postal inspector had testified that he had obtained oral confessions from Evans during the course of interrogations at the city jail where Evans had been in custody.
29
The postal inspector claimed that Evans had admitted that he had an accomplice, and that, in a second confession, Evans had identified Bruton as that accomplice. 3 0 The Court of Appeals, relying on Delli Paoli v. United States, 3 ' affirmed Bruton's conviction because the trial judge had adequately instructed the jury to disregard the confession of Evans in determining Bruton's guilt or innocence. The Bruton majority expressly overruled Delli Paoli and reversed Bruton's conviction. The Court reasoned as follows: first, when the hearsay evidence is a codefendant's confession inculpating the defendant, an instruction to the jury to disregard that hearsay in the case against the defendant is likely to be ineffective; 3 3 second, admission of the confession in a joint jury trial is, therefore, a defacto admission of the confession as evidence against the nonconfessing defendant; 3 4 and third, because the confession is both "inevitably suspect" 3 5 and "devastating" 3 6 to the defendant's case, this defacto admission of the confession without the test of cross-examination violates the defendant's right of confrontation.
37
Having deemed accomplice confessions inherently suspect, and having referred to their "unreliability," 38 the Court, nevertheless, withheld judgment as to whether a trial judge's decision to admit a codefendant's confession as evidence against a defendant would violate the Confrontation Clause:
We emphasize that the hearsay statement inculpating petitioner was clearly inadmissible against him under traditional rules of evidence, . . . the problem arising only because the statement was ... admissible against the declarant Evans .... There is not before us, therefore, any recognized exception to the hearsay rule and we intimate no view whatever that such exceptions necessarily raise questions under the Confrontation Clause. The reservation of the question appeared to contradict the rationale of the Court's holding. The Court seemed to say that exclusion, through limiting instructions, of a codefendant's confession as evidence against a defendant violates the Confrontation Clause where there is a danger that, disregarding the instructions, a jury will use the codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant; 4 0 nevertheless, the Court did not intimate a view whether admission of the codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant, under a recognized hearsay exception, would violate the defendant's confrontation rights. It seemed to say that procedures which amount to a defacto admission of a codefendant's confession as evidence against a defendant violate the Confrontation Clause although the dejure admission of the same codefendant's confession against the defendant might not violate the Confrontation Clause. The reservation also seemed to contradict the spirit of the decision. Justice Stewart argued that a "basic premise of the Confrontation Clause," as reflected in cases like Pointer and Douglas, is that "certain kinds of hearsay [citations omitted] are at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult to discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give such evidence the minimal weight it logically deserves, whatever instructions the trial judge might give.
' 4 5 He added that "[i]t is for this very reason that an out-of-court accusation is universally conceded to be constitutionally inadmissible against the accused, rather than admissible for the little it may be worth."
In 1970, two years after Bruton, Justice Stewart departed from his Bruton concurrence when he authored the plurality opinion in Dutton v. Evans. 4 7 Justice Stewart indicated that some post-arrest out-of-court accusations made by one alleged offender may be admitted against a purported accomplice, without an opportunity for cross-examination, and still not violate the Confrontation Clause. 4 8 In Dutton, Georgia prosecuted Alex Evans for the murder of three police officers. 4 9 The court severed the Evans trial from the trial of codefendant Williams. 50 A man named Shaw was one of the twenty prosecution witnesses:
He testified that he and Williams had been fellow prisoners in the federal penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia, at the time Williams was brought to Gwinnett County to be arraigned on the charges of murdering the police officers. Shaw said that when Williams was returned to the penitentiary from the arraignment, he had asked Williams: "How did you make out in court?" and that Williams had responded, "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now." 5 '
The defense made hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections to the use of Williams' out-of-court declaration against Evans. 52 The trial court rejected both objections, relying on a Georgia hearsay statute that, atypically, allowed use of such jailhouse declarations.
5 3
When the matter reached the United States Supreme Court, a plurality of four declared that use of the hearsay was consonant with the Confrontation Clause. 54 The plurality distinguished Bruton by noting that the hearsay accusations against Bruton were not admissible under the governing domestic rules of evidence. 5 5 Deviating from the thesis he had advanced in his Bruton concurrence, 5 6 Justice
Stewart observed for the plurality that Bruton had reserved the question of when the use of hearsay violated the Confrontation Clause. of reliability" approach for judging whether, in the absence of an opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine the hearsay declarant' the use for its truth of another's out-of-court statement violates the right to confront witnesses. 5 9 In providing the fifth vote needed to sustain the actions of the Georgia trial judge, Justice Harlan in Dutton declared that the Confrontation Clause was not meant to control the scope of the rules of evidence. 6 0 He concluded that the admission of hearsay against a criminal defendant is constitutional unless such admission would deny the defendants a fair trial in contravention of the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. 6 1 Relying upon English cases dating to 1663, Justice Harlan stated that he would be prepared "to hold as a matter of due process that a confession of an accomplice resulting from formal police interrogation cannot be introduced as evidence of the guilt of an accused, absent some circumstances indicating [the accused's] authorization or adoption" of the declarant's statement. 6 2 Dutton, however, did not involve a police-elicited statement; but, instead, it involved a statement allegedly made to the defrontation cases have proceeded on parallel tracks, one involving single defendants, the other multiple defendants. Without specifically discussing the anomaly, he suggests that the two lines of cases may meet someday. See Seidelson, The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme Court: Some Good News and Some Bad News, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 51, 86-88 (1988 REV. 366 (1966) .
Most commentators are critical of the Court's declaration that "indicia of reliability" can substitute for cross-examination so as to fulfill the Confrontation Clause guaranty. This criticism is wholly apart from their view of whether courts should require the prosecution to demonstrate the unavailability of the hearsay declarant before allowing it to introduce a hearsay declaration. See infra note 53.
60 Dutton, 400 U.S. at 94. 61 Id. at 94-99 (Harlan, J., concurring). 62 Id. at 98 (Harlan, J., concurring).
clarant's own friend or associate. 63 Justice Harlan concluded that due process is not offended when the court admits, under a declaration against interest hearsay exception, codefendant statements which are not elicited through formal police interrogation.
64
Justice Marshall dissented, and was joined by Justices Brennan (author of Bruton), Black, and Douglas. 6 5 . Justice Marshall argued that, in the absence of a defense opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, use of an incriminatory extrajudicial statement of an alleged accomplice violates the defendant's right of confrontation.
66
Marshall deemed it irrelevant whether the hearsay statement was made "during official interrogation." 67 The Dutton dissenters viewed the majority's opinion as inconsistent with Douglas and Bruton. Justice Marshall interpreted Bruton as if Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Bruton had prevailed: use of an alleged fellow offender's statement as evidence against a defendant violates the defendant's right of confrontation, at least where, at trial, the defendant has no opportunity to cross-examine the fellow offender.
68
If either the views of Justice Harlan or those of the Evans dissenters had prevailed, there would be no tension between Bruton and Dutton. Under either approach, the Constitution would require severance, or some other solution to the Bruton problem, 69 70 Justice Harlan in Dutton did not abandon the position he had taken while joining Justice White's dissent in Bruton: a limiting instruction may be adequate to prevent a jury from using one defendant's confession as evidence against a codefendant. Bruton, 391 U.S. 123, 138-44 (White, J., dissenting). The Bruton dissent in which Harlanjoined attacked the reliability of one defendant's police-elicited confession in so far as it implicated a codefendant, so that Harlan's views in Bruton were consistent with those he expressed in Dutton.
The Dutton dissenters, through Justice Marshall, observed that the result in Bruton could be avoided on a "wholesale" basis by an interpretation of the Confrontation Clause which often would allow prosecutors to use a codefendant's confession as substantive evidence against a defendant. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Interestingly, three of the four justices who dissented in Dutton later abandoned their The tension, however, remained under the plurality approach. Read in light of Bruton, the plurality definitely suggested that, in the absence of some other solution to the Bruton' problem, such as redaction or a prosecutor's willingness not to offer the confession even as evidence against the confessing codefendant, the Confrontation Clause required severance in codefendant confession cases where domestic law prohibited use of the codefendant's cross-implicating statement, even though the Constitution did not require such exclusion.
C. LEE AND EARNEST
In 1986, Lee v. Illinois71 reaffirmed Bruton's confrontation rationale and its emphasis upon the ineffectiveness of an instruction directing the jury to disregard an accomplice's confession that is both "inevitably suspect" and "devastating" to the defendant's case. 72 However, the Court distinguished Bruton on the ground that the case before it, arising from a bench trial, did not involve the effectiveness of a limiting instruction. 73 Indeed, the Court stated that the only question for consideration was "whether [the] substantive use of the hearsay confession denied Petitioner rights guaranteed her under the Confrontation Clause." ' 74 In resolving this issue, the Court concluded that an accomplice's inculpatory declarations are presumptively unreliable, but that this presumption may be overcome where sufficient "indicia of reliability" are present to ensure their trustworthiness. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 633 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) , where they argued that the result in Bruton depended upon the assumption that a codefendant's confession was inadmissible against the defendant under domestic law without regard to whether its use against the defendant would have violated the defendant's right to confront witnesses. (1989) . See also Haddad, supra note 6, at 11-12 nn.48-49. In a joint bench trial, Lee's trial judge erroneously relied upon the Thomas confession in assessing the guilt of Lee. Lee, 476 U.S. at 538. The Illinois Appellate Court compounded the error by holding that the Thomas confession was admissible against Lee because it interlocked with Lee's own confession. In making this ruling, the court relied on Illinois cases which held merely that severance was not required under these circumstances. Id. at 538-39. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that it was without authority to reverse an Illinois court for misinterpreting Illinois law. Id. at 539.
75 The Lee majority held that the confession of codefendant Thomas, when used as Thus, in dictum, even the more liberal members of the Court in Lee appeared to embrace much of the indicia-of-reliability jurispruevidence against defendant Lee, "did not bear sufficient independent 'indicia of reliability' " to meet Confrontation Clause standards. Id. (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) ). The four dissenters agreed with the majority in Lee: sometimes the Constitution permits the prosecution to use a codefendant's confession as evidence against a defendant. Lee, 476 U.S. at 549. They appeared to depart not so much as to the standard used to determine when such admission would be constitutionally proper, but rather in the application of the standard to the facts of the case. Id. at 547 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Reliability may not be the only relevant concern. Issues may arise as to the availability of the hearsay declarant. Where the prosecution in a joint trial attempts to introduce one defendant's confession as evidence against a codefendant under a declaration against interest hearsay exception, it probably need not demonstrate the unavailability of the hearsay declarant in order to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. This is because a showing of unavailability is unnecessary where the rationale for a hearsay exception is that the circumstances surrounding the making of a hearsay statement tend to guarantee its trustworthiness. See United v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986) , rejecting dictum in Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65, which had suggested that a showing of the declarant's unavailability is always essential to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
On the other hand, a showing of unavailability is still required to satisfy the domestic law declaration against interest hearsay exception. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 804. When the prosecution seeks to use codefendant A's confession as evidence in its case-in-chief against defendant B, should the law consider A to be unavailable? justice Stevens once suggested that A is available because the prosecution has the power to grant A immunity.
Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 87 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). By contrastJustice Blackmun, joined by three other justices, apparently was willing to presume that a codefendant is unavailable as a prosecution witness when he himself is on trial. Lee, 476 U.S. at 549 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Reviewing courts rather routinely say that a codefendant who did not testify on his own behalf was unavailable to the prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1978 ) (rejecting argument that non-defendant declarant who claims the fifth amendment privilege is nevertheless available to the prosecution because of its power to secure an order of immunity); United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354, 361 (7th Cir. 1986 dence of the plurality opinion of Dutton. In so doing, the Court assumed that under some limited circumstances, though not in Lee, the Confrontation Clause permits use of a codefendant's confession as substantive evidence against a defendant. 7 6 Hence, in Lee, all nine justices agreed that, depending upon the precise substance of the confession made by codefendant Thomas, the prosecution, consistent with the Confrontation Clause, could have introduced the Thomas confession as evidence against defendant Lee, if domestic law so permitted. 77 Although two of the Dutton dissenters, Justices Marshall and Brennan, remained on the Court, the indicia-of-reliability approach of the Dutton four-person plurality now commanded unanimity.
Accordingly, the tension grew. The Court in Lee seemed to indicate that, under some circumstances, an instruction telling a jury not to consider a codefendant's confession in adjudicating a defendant's guilt was a defacto use of the confession, which would violate the defendant's confrontation rights; yet an instruction directing the jury to consider the same confession as evidence against the defendant (the dejure use) would not violate the defendant's constitutional rights.
The only way to escape this anomaly would be to hold that Bruton is applicable only where the Confrontation Clause would prohibit the de jure admission of the codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant. This would require an individualized scrutiny of the reliability of the particular codefendant confession. However, the Bruton court had not so scrutinized the confession of codefendant Evans. Nor had it suggested that such scrutiny was necessary before the Court could determine whether the limiting instruction procedure violated the Confrontation Clause. may be deemed unavailable simply because he or she did not testify. See, e.g., United States v. Monks, 774 F.2d 945, 952 (9th Cir. 1985) .
The authors believe that trial courts should require the prosecution to call the confessing codefendant, out of the jury's presence, to determine whether the codefendant will refuse to testify, before the prosecution will be deemed to have satisfied the domestic law requirement of unavailability. In this we agree with seven Fifth Circuit judges who dissented from an en banc ruling in Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 549 (5th Cir. 1972) (Rives,J., dissenting). We do not believe the prosecution need grant the defendant immunity. If the codefendant declines to testify for the prosecution but later testifies on his own behalf, we do not believe that his belated availability should destroy the prosecution's earlier invocation of a domestic law declaration against interest hearsay exception. "Unavailability" should be measured at the time the prosecution offers the declarant's statement. 76 See supra the first paragraph of note 75. 77 Lee, 476 U.S. at 543; id. at 548 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
After Lee, the Supreme Court in New Mexico v. Earnest 7 8 granted the prosecution's certiorari petition and, in a single sentence, remanded to the New Mexico Supreme Court 79 a case in which the prosecution argued that, consistent with the Confrontation Clause, a trial judge could admit a codefendant's police-elicited confession as evidence against a defendant under a declaration against interest hearsay exception. 8 0 Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice O'Connor. 8 ' He noted that, under Lee, lack of cross-examination of a hearsay declarant is not necessarily violative of the Confrontation Clause. He added, "the State is entitled to an opportunity to overcome the weighty presumption of unreliability attaching to codefendant statements by demonstrating that the particular statement at issue bears sufficient 'indicia of reliability' to satisfy Confrontation Clause concerns."
Under the view expressed in the concurring Earnest opinion, the Bruton-severance-confrontation anomaly was apparent. If New Mexico law prohibited use of a codefendant's confession against a defendant, in the absence of redaction or some other solution, Bruton arguably required severance lest the procedure violate the defendant's right of confrontation. If, however, state law permitted use of the codefendant's accusation as evidence against a defendant, the procedure would not violate the Confrontation Clause if sufficient "indicia of reliability" surrounded the hearsay declaration so as to overcome the presumption of unreliability.
D.
THE LOWER COURT DECISIONS
The degree to which a declaration against interest theory could erode Bruton depends upon the frequency of the prosecution's success in convincing courts that declarations against interest are reliable enough to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Despite the result in Lee, post-Lee decisions in state and federal reviewing courts suggest that the prosecution often will prevail in contending that a particular third-party declaration against interest is reliable enough to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Numerous decisions have con-78 77 U.S. 648 (1986) (per curiam). cluded that the prosecution has overcome the presumption of unreliability described in Lee. 83 A minority of these decisions, including the Earnest case on remand, have allowed use of statements made by a declarant at a time when the.declarant knew that he or she was dealing with the authorities, either during custodial police interrogation or while entering a plea of guilty. 8 4 A few of these decisions have involved statements of codefendants. 8 5 In jurisdictions that admit inculpatory declarations against penal interest, admission of the codefendant's "constitutionally reliable" confession as evidence against a defendant will avoid Bruton, just as Justice Marshall predicted in Dutton. 8 6 The Bruton limiting instruction problem disappears once such a statement is admitted against the defendant.
In those jurisdictions whose evidentiary rules would prohibit use of the codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant, even though the Confrontation Clause would not mandate such exclusion, the question remains whether Bruton requires severance lest juries improperly consider against the defendant a statement of a codefendant. The next section examines this question.
III. THE ABSENCE OF A CONFRONTATION VIOLATION WHERE THE
CODEFENDANT'S STATEMENT, THOUGH CONSTITUTIONALLY ADMISSIBLE, Is INADMISSIBLE AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT UNDER DOMESTIC LAW
Since Bruton, prosecutors have invoked a wide variety of theories in efforts to avoid severance in codefendant confession cases. 8 7 One would have thought, therefore, that, at least after the 1970 Dutton decision, 88 they would have argued in both the United States Supreme Court and in the lower courts that Bruton requires severance, in the absence of some other remedy, only where the Confrontation Clause would have mandated the exclusion of the codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant. They surely would have contended that where domestic evidence rules exclude the confession as evidence against the defendant, but where the Confrontation Clause would not mandate exclusion, a limiting instruction procedure is adequate and does not violate the Confrontation Clause.
Thousands of post-Dutton, pre-Lee decisions, from 1970 to 1986, however, appeared not to reflect such an argument. 8 9 Perhaps prosecutors paid too little attention to the theory underlying the decisions. Perhaps they acquiesced in the "sloppy reading" of Bruton as holding that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the use of a codefendant's confession as evidence against a defendant. 90 In any event, rarely before Cruz v. New York 9 t in 1987 did prosecutors advance such an argument. Even so, the Cruz Court did not reach stances, for example: 1) where the case is tried without a jury; 2) where the confessing codefendant testifies; 3) where the defendant has himself confessed; 4) where the codefendant's statement is admissible against the defendant as non-hearsay or under a hearsay exception such as those for excited utterances or coconspirator declarations; 5) where the statement of the codefendant on its face does not implicate the defendant; 6) where the court has redacted the codefendant's statement to mask references to the defendant. Moreover, many prosecutors have avoided completely separate trials by using a "dual" jury procedure or by agreeing not to use the confession even as against the confessing defendant. See generally Garcia, supra note 6 at 401 (discussing various methods of avoiding Bruton); Haddad, supra note 2, at 3-33 (discussing subdoctrines arising after Bruton). 88 400 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also supra note 9. Clause, id., even though it assumed arguendo that no hearsay exception would permit the use of the Pugh statements as evidence against Fort. Id. at 832 n.5.
It also appears that after Lee but before Cruz, the prosecution in United States v. Kurka, 818 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1987), appeal after remand, 867 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1989), sought to avoid a Bruton problem by arguing that the statement of Combs, which had been admitted solely against Combs, was reliable enough as to defendant Kurka so that its admission against Kurka would not have violated Kurka's confrontation rights. Id. at 1431. The court responded by concluding that the statement failed to bear adequate indicia of reliability to satisfy the Dutton standard. Id. at 1432. 92 The Cruz opinion makes no reference at all to the prosecution's argument. 93 Brief of Respondent at 36-38, Cruz, 481 U.S. at 186; Brief of Amicus Curiae United States of America in Support of Respondent at 10-18, Cruz, 481 U.S. at 186. The Solicitor General phrased the first issue as "whether the judgment can be supported on the ground that the non-testifying co-defendant's confession was sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Confrontation Clause." Id. at I. 94 1059 (1987 ), vacated, 134 A.D.2d 300, 520 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1987 People v. Young, 122 A.D.2d 863, 505 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1986 ), rev'd, 70 N.Y.2d 9, 509 N.E.2d 1226 , 517 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1987 ), modified, 70 N.Y.2d 722, 513 N.E.2d 1302 , 519 N.Y.2d 641 (1987 4156 (1987) . The question of waiver also arose at oral argument in Cruz. Transcript of Argument at 33-35. Even though a respondent normally can sustain ajudgment based upon any ground which appears in the record, some decisions recognize an exception where the petitioner, for lack of fair notice of respondent's theory, did not have an adequate opportunity to develop the record. Compare United States v. New York Tel., 434 U.S. 159, 166 n.8 (1977) (court has discretion to consider any basis for supporting the judgment below even if the prevailing party did not advance the claim in the court below) with Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814-15 n.1 (1985) (court declined to consider argument which appellee had not made in court below) and Steagald v. U.S., 451 U.S. 204, 209 (1981) (court would not consider appellee's argument where appellee expressly refused to advance such argument in court below). A middle ground is for the reviewing court to remand for an evidentiary hearing on the point not originally developed at trial. See Combs v. United States, 408 U. S. 224 (1972) . In Combs, the prosecution had won in trial court on the merits of a fourth amendment claim without challenging defendant's standing, id. at 227; when the prosecution defended the trial court's judgment on the alternative ground of "no standing," the Supreme Court remanded to permit litigation of the standing question. Id. at 228. Presumably, the petitioner in Cruz was deprived of a fair opportunity to make a record demonstrating the unreliability of his codefendant's statement. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
Cruz held that there is no exception to Bruton where each defendant has made a substantially similar statement which, under domestic law, is admissible against the declarant but not against his or her codefendant. Presumably, because of the prosecution's procedural default, Cruz did not consider whether a different result would follow if one defendant's statement was reliable enough to be admitted against the codefendant without violating his or her confrontation rights. Interestingly, while arguing that the issue was not properly before the Court, that the codefendant's confession was not reliable as to defendant Cruz, and that the declarant was available to the prosecution, Petitioner Cruz did not challenge the respondent's contention that Bruton is inapplicable where the trial court, under domestic law, excluded the codefendant's statement as evidence against the defendant, but the Confrontation Clause would have allowed such use. Justice Blackmun did not offer an argument in support of this claim, which appeared to contradict the implications to be drawn from Bruton, the Dutton plurality, the Lee majority, and the Earnest concurrence.
10 2 Moreover, the context in which Justice Blackmun made this assertion weighs against a definitive conclusion that he meant that Bruton would not require severance, even if domestic law prohibited admission, of the codefendant's statement against the defendant, as long as the Confrontation Clause did not prohibit admissibility. In the same footnote, Justice Blackmun, without referring to a sixth amendment objection, stressed that because of domestic law, the codefendant's statement was not admitted against defendant Bruton. 0 3 Moreover, he cited a case which holds that where a codefendant's statement, under domestic law, is admitted against a defendant, there is no Bruton problem. against penal interest could be received against a third person. He argued that, because it is armed with the power of immunity, the prosecution cannot demonstrate the unavailability of a person who is present in court as a defendant. See supra note 75. Thus, under a Stevens approach, Bruton severance problems could not be avoided by a claim that the use of codefendant's statement against the defendant would be constitutionally permissible. The issue would not arise because, in light of the availability of the codefendant-declarant, the use of such evidence would always violate the defendant's confrontation rights.
gest [s] that a codefendant's interlocking confession will often be admissible against the defendant, in which event there would not be the Confrontation Clause issue Bruton identified."l 0 7 He added that he read the majority opinion to permit New York courts on remand to consider "the admissibility of that confession against Cruz."' 1 0 8 Justice White's comments are ambiguous. Admissibility has two components. The use of a codefendant's confession against a defendant must be permitted by a domestic law exception to the hearsay rule. Beyond that, such use must not violate the Confrontation Clause. Was Justice White saying that there is no Bruton problem as long as a codefendant's admission would not violate the Confrontation Clause even if domestic law prohibited use of the statement? Or, was he making the unremarkable assertion that no Bruton problem exists where a statement is actually admitted under a domestic law exception to the hearsay rule where such statement is sufficiently reliable to meet confrontation standards? The reader cannot know for sure whether Justice White meant to address the issue which is the focus of the present paper. In some instances, reviewing courts have told prosecutors that it is too late to raise this claim for the first time in defending a conviction on appeal because, where the trial court under domestic law excluded the codefendant's statement as evidence against the defendant, the parties had no occasion to litigate whether the codefendant's accusations against the defendant bore adequate indicia of reliability so that their use would comport with the Confrontation Clause. 1 1
In other instances, courts have rejected on the merits claims that the codefendant's accusations were reliable enotigh so that their use as evidence against the defendant would have satisfied the Confrontation Clause.' 12 Perhaps an eager prosecutor would read the latter cases as implicitly recognizing that no severance would have been required if the codefendant's statement had been reliable enough to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, even though domestic law did not permit admission of the codefendant's statement against the defendant. However, any such implication would be in the nature of dictum. Moreover, in most of these cases, the reviewing court has not even paused to note the distinction between domestic law admissibility and constitutional admissibility." The cases do not include a clear statement declaring that even though the trial judge excluded use of the codefendant's statement as evidence against the defendant, and even though state law required such exclusion, Bruton would not command reversal unless the Confrontation Clause would have required exclusion of the codefendant's statement as evidence against the defendant. None of the lower court cases cite the previously discussed statements ofJusCruz in each of thesecases. Cruz had rejected an exception which had been accepted by the plurality opinions in Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979) . See supra note 96. In each case, the prosecution responded by asserting that the statements were reliable enough to overcome the presumption of unreliability described in Lee. II See, e.g., Cruz, 70 tice Blackmun in Lee and Justice White in Cruz, even though these are the only statements by Supreme Court justices which arguably voice an opinion on the issue. 114 Thus the lower court decisions shed no useful light on this important question.
C. THE AUTHORS' VIEWS
At the outset, we state our bias: we favor the result reached in Bruton. Once ajurisdiction decides for whatever reason that a codefendant's cross-implicating confession is inadmissible against a defendant, because alternatives such as severance and redaction exist, its courts should not allow a prosecutor to place that confession before the defendant's jury subject only to a presumptively ineffective limiting instruction. Residing in a state that reached the "Bruton result" decades before Bruton-on procedural fairness grounds rather than on confrontation grounds' 1 5 -we are not troubled that the Court invoked the Constitution to outlaw the limiting instruction procedure in both state and federal codefendant confession cases. We wish, moreover, that courts would apply a procedural fairness analysis to prevent the use of certain ineffective limiting instructions in other contexts. One of the authors has provided a detailed analysis of criteria arguably relevant to an assessment of the fairness of various sorts of limiting instructions." 6 However, we do not believe that courts can properly interpret the Confrontation Clause to prohibit the limiting instruction tech- 114 See supra text accompanying notes 101-108. 115 See Haddad, supra note 6, at 11-12 n.48-49; People v. Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d 400, 530 N.E. 2d 423 (1988). Most pre-Bruton decisions which required severance in codefendant confession cases did so from a concern that otherwise a jury would consider evidence which the law deemed inadmissible. They did not do so because of a concern that denial of severance would lead to the conviction of the innocent. Haddad, supra note 6, at 44-45. Hence our reference to procedural fairness.
116 Haddad, supra note 6, at 39-49. Claims that limiting instructions are likely to be ineffective can arise in many contexts, such as where "other crime" evidence is admitted solely on the question of the accused's motive; where evidence relevant only to sentencing is admitted before a jury in a unified proceeding to determine both guilt-innocence and appropriate punishment, as in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967) ; and where the Miranda-violative statement of a defendant or the prior inconsistent statement of a witness is admitted solely for impeachment. Which uses are so unfair that courts should prohibit them? In his article, Professor Haddad considered five possible criteria for evaluating the relative fairness of limiting instruction procedures: (1) the degree of ineffectiveness of the instruction; (2) the fact that if the jury disregarded the instruction it would be considering constitutionally inadmissible evidence; (3) the degree of danger of convicting an innocent person if the jury disregards the instruction; (4) the likely impact of the evidence if the jury improperly considers it; and (5) the availability and costs of alternatives to the limiting instruction procedure. He concluded that the fourth and especially the fifth criteria are the most useful guides to comparing the relative fairness of limiting instruction procedures. Haddad, supra note 6 at 49. See also infra note 138.
nique where, despite a jurisdiction's domestic law bar against the use of a codefendant's confession as evidence against a defendant, the Confrontation Clause would not prohibit such a use.
One argument favoring our conclusion would assert that the Supreme Court should not prohibit the "lesser" course of conduct where it interprets the Constitution so as to permit the "greater." Under that analysis, once the Court reads the Confrontation Clause to allow the greater conduct, namely the admission of a codefendant's statement as evidence against a defendant, it cannot interpret the same clause to prohibit the "lesser conduct," namely the exclusion of the evidence subject to a limiting instruction that might well be ineffective.
This "greater includes the lesser" approach has been advanced in several constitutional contexts, from free speech to the use of presumptions in criminal cases. 11 7 However, courts do not always accept the greater-lesser analysis in other areas; therefore, we choose not to rely upon it. 11 8 Instead, we look to the terms of Bruton itself.
According to Bruton, the worst thing that can happen under the U.S. 328, 346-47 n.10 (suggesting that the power to prohibit advertisement of a product flows from the power to ban the product even if the legislature has chosen to permit its sale); Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928) (as long as legislature could create personal liability for bank directors if circumstance B were present, the legislature can make directors liable if circumstance A is present and then can declare that evidence of circumstance B is prima facie evidence of circumstance A). 118 A state legislature could make the presence of mitigating circumstances reducing murder to manslaughter a partial affirmative defense to murder, relieving the prosecution of the burden of proving the absence of these circumstances. However, once a state defines the absence of those circumstances as an element of murder, due process mandates that the prosecution prove the absence beyond a reasonable doubt. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1977); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) . See also United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965) (seemingly inconsistent with Feny, 277 U.S. 88, in its holding that due process requires a rational connection between the established fact A and the presumed fact B).
A state need not provide the right to appeal to convicted criminals; however, once it has done so, it thrusts upon itself certain burdens under both due process and equal protection. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (establishing indigent appellant's right to free transcript or its equivalent); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (establishing indigent's right to appellate counsel for first felony appeal). It need not provide welfare benefits, but by doing so it may acquire procedural due process obligations. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) .
A state need not define a jury's role in capital sentencing procedures, but once it does so, the eighth amendment prohibits it from tolerating prosecutorial arguments which might lead ajury to conclude that its role is not so important. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) . By structuring penal statutes one way, a state may be prohibited by double jeopardy principles from imposing a penalty equivalent to one permissible under differently structured penal statutes. See Thomas limiting instruction procedure is that the instruction will fail, and the jury will use the statement of the codefendant as evidence against the defendant.' 1 9 The codefendant, in effect, will become a witness against the defendant. Where the codefendant has not testified, the defendant will not have the opportunity to stand face-toface with his or her accuser and to cross-examine him or her while he or she is under oath and while the jury is able to scrutinize the demeanor of the accuser.
However, in cases where the Confrontation Clause would permit a trial court to direct the jury to consider hearsay as evidence against a defendant, the Supreme Court has decided that the lack of such an opportunity to cross-examine does not necessarily violate the sixth amendment.
120 Once it appears that, under Dutton and Lee, an out-of-court accusation bears sufficient indicia of reliability to permit recognition of an exception to the requirements of oath, face-to-face meeting, demeanor scrutiny, and cross-examination, the matter is at an end. There is no way to avoid this result without rejecting the jurisprudence appearing in decisions from Dutton through Lee.
A defendant may be in an awkward position where a codefendant's statement is deemed inadmissible hearsay in the defendant's case, and, nevertheless, the defendant's jury has heard the codefendant's hearsay accusations. At least in cases where the prosecution can survive a defendant's motion for a directed verdict without having to rely upon the codefendant's statement, a defendant might prefer to have the trial court admit the codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant. Then the defendant could make a frontal assault upon the codefendant's hearsay accusations.
This, however, is not a sixth amendment problem. As long as the defendant is allowed normal modes of impeaching hearsay declarants-just as if the hearsay had been admitted against him or her-it is hard to see how he or she can claim denial of confrontation. The problem is a tactical one, much like that faced by a defendant in Nelson v. O'Neil. 12 1 In that situation, the codefendant's hearsay statement also remains inadmissible as to the defendant even though the codefendant testifies and is available for confronta-119 For a discussion of the claim that limiting instructions will be ineffective in codefendant confession cases, see Haddad, supra note 6, at 40-42, which asserted that empirical data was not available to measure the effectiveness of limiting instructions in any particular context and that intuitively other limiting instructions are as likely to be disobeyed as is the codefendant instruction condemned in Bruton.
120 See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) . See also supra text accompanying notes 47-82. 121 402 U.S. 622 (1970) . See infra notes 129-132.
tion. 12 2 In both situations, the defendant must decide whether to attack the codefendant's hearsay accusations even though the court will direct the jury not to consider that accusation in determining the defendant's guilt. On the other hand, as Justice Brennan suggested by implication in Nelson v. O'Neil, 123 the limiting instruction problem that gave rise to Bruton is not solved simply because there has been no violation of the Confrontation Clause. If a particular jurisdiction deems a codefendant's confession inadmissible hearsay as to a defendant, there is a danger that the jury in a joint trial will misuse the evidence. The substantial probability of such misuse is an essential premise of the Bruton decision. 124 Where domestic law prohibits the jury from considering a codefendant's confession as evidence against a defendant, such misuse is possible in ajoint trial even when the defendant testifies, as in Nelson. Misuse is also possible where the jurisdiction chooses not to admit a non-testifying codefendant's confession as evidence against a defendant even where the Confrontation Clause would permit use of such hearsay.
In jurisdictions which still prohibit use of a codefendant's confession as evidence against a defendant, as did almost every American jurisdiction did before the advent of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the 1970's, 125 the essential problem of codefendant confession cases is that by utilizing an ineffective limiting instruction in ajoint trial, courts would subvert a domestic law hearsay prohibition in a limited class of cases, namely, those where the codefendants are jointly tried before ajury and the evidence shows that one defendant has made a statement implicating the other in a crime. Jurisdictions which long before Bruton reached the "Bruton result" recognized this problem.
126
Justice Brennan, the author of Bruton, also recognized this problem when he later dissented in Nelson v. O'Neil.1 2 7 In O'Neil the confessing codefendant took the stand and underwent cross-examination by the defendant. 128 The trial court, under domestic law, deemed the codefendant's post-arrest statement inadmissible hearsay as to the defendant, and it so informed the jury through a limit- The question, therefore, is whether California, having determined for whatever reason that the statement involved in this case was inadmissible against respondent, may nevertheless present the statement to the jury that was to decide respondent's guilt, and instruct that jury that it should not be considered against respondent.... In the present case, California itself has made the judgment that, although Runnels did take the stand, his extrajudicial statements could not be considered by the jury as evidence against respondent ....
[H]aving made the determination that Runnels' statement could not be considered as evidence against O'Neil[, California] may not subvert its own judgment in some but not all cases by presenting the inadmissible evidence to the jury and telling the jury to disregard it. For the inevitable result of this procedure is that, in fact, different rules of evidence will be applied to different defendants depending solely upon the fortuity of whether they are jointly or separately tried. This is a discrimination that the Constitution forbids.'
32
The Nelson majority did not reject the dissenters' premise that the jury was unlikely to adhere to the limiting instruction in cases where the confessing defendant testified. Rather, the majority said that every requirement of the Confrontation Clause was satisfied once the confessing codefendant testified and was subject to full cross-examination by the defendant in a face-to-face confrontation between accuser and accused in the presence of the jury. If the Nelson majority's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was wrong, then confrontation protections would extend even to some cases where the accused has been allowed to stand face-to-face with his accuser and to cross-examine him in the jury's presence. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (admission of declarant's prior inconsistent statement does not violate Confrontation Clause when declarant testified as witness at trial and was subject to full cross-examination). One lower court has suggested that, except in the case of prior inconsistent statements, a defendant has a sixth amendment right to immediately cross-examine a declarant, at least where the declaration does
The problem with the Nelson dissent is that Justice Brennan did not say which constitutional provision prohibits California from subverting its own rules of evidence. Because he relied upon Bruton, a sixth amendment case, he was presumably referring to the Confrontation Clause. However, one cannot find in that clause such a prohibition. To do so, one would have to reason as follows: because the Confrontation Clause sometimes helps to promote fairness, the Confrontation Clause therefore prohibits any procedure which undermines fairness. This is a classical fallacy.' 3 5 It is akin to arguing that because the exclusionary rule promotes deterrence of police misconduct, the exclusionary rule therefore prohibits any procedure, such as an enforcement of a standing requirement, that undermines deterrence of police misconduct. 13 6 Similarly, it is like asserting that because the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination promotes personal privacy, the amendment prohibits any testimonial compulsion that undermines personal privacy.'
37
The solution to the "Bruton problem" lies in a substitution of a procedural fairness analysis for a confrontation approach, as one of the authors has argued at length elsewhere.' 3 8 If it is unfair for a state to exclude evidence as to a particular defendant, but then to use a joint trial approach which creates a grave danger that a jury will improperly use such evidence against that defendant, even where the Confrontation Clause does not mandate exclusion of such hearsay as against the defendant, then state courts should require severance, wholly apart from constitutional principles. If a state has determined that ajury should not consider one defendant's confesnot bear adequate indicia of reliability. See People v. Bastien, 129 Ill. 2d 64, 541 N.E.2d 670 (1989) , which overlooks Nelson. The opinion offers no textual or historical basis in the Confrontation Clause requiring immediate cross-examination.
135 Expressed as a syllogism, the argument would be:
(1) The Confrontation Clause promotes fairness; (2) The prohibition against the limiting instruction procedure promotes fairness; (3) Therefore, conformity to the Confrontation Clause requires a prohibition against the limiting instruction procedure.
For an example of the fallacy in the Bruton context, see Note,
CREIGHTON L. REv. 199 (1971) .
136 "Neither those cases [which acknowledge the deterrent aim of the exclusionary rule] nor any others hold that anything which deters illegal searches is thereby commanded by the Fourth Amendment." Alderman v. U.S., 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) .
137 See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956) , rejecting the view that a grant of immunity was inadequate to satisfy privacy concerns. Contra id. at 446-54 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 138 See Haddad, note 6, at 39-49. See also supra note 116. Professor Haddad referred to a "due process" rather than a "procedural fairness" approach. This label, however, quite improperly assumed, without discussion, that the Due Process Clause prohibits states from undermining their own rules of evidence, at least under some circumstances. See infra note 140. sion as evidence against another defendant, then it should prohibit on domestic law grounds the use of a limiting instruction that is inadequate to prevent a jury from making such use of the confession. This is exactly what some courts did before Bruton.1 3 9 We leave for another day the question of whether courts can properly invoke the Due Process Clause to prohibit use of an unfair limiting instruction procedure where a jurisdiction's decision to admit such evidence would not violate the Constitution.
140
For now, our main conclusion is that the Confrontation Clause is useless to solve the problem of misuse of evidence under consideration in this paper, just as it is useless to cure the problem of misuse of evidence when the confessing codefendant is subject to crossexamination in the Nelson v. O'Neil situation.
The situation is reminiscent of the invocation in United States v. Wade 14 1 of the sixth amendment right to counsel to address the problems of fallible eye-witness testimony and suggestive police identification procedures. The Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois 1 4 2 may have been correct when it interpreted the sixth amendment as attaching only upon the initiation of formal adversary judicial proceedings. 1 4 3 Once the Kirby Court so narrowly construed the right established in Wade, because the great majority of lineups and showups occur before the initiation of formal adversary proceedings, the sixth amendment right to counsel was unavailable to remedy what the Court in Wade had deemed to be problems of extraordinary magnitude.' 44 The fact that the Court found no sixth amendment 139 See Haddad, supra note 2, at 33 n.164. 140 For such an argument to prevail, a defendant would have to overcome the barrier of the "greater-lesser" analysis described in supra note 117. Even a court which rejected such an approach might not accept a due process claim. If a defendant advanced a generalized due process-irrationality claim, the prosecution would respond that government has a legitimate interest in the consolidation of the trials ofjointly indicted defendants, so that the need to avoid severance justifies use of the limiting instruction procedure. If the defendant advanced an "entitlement" theory rooted in the state's adoption of a rule excluding certain kinds of hearsay, the prosecution might cite a series of recent cases that severely limit earlier entitlement doctrines. See, e.g., Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 109 S. Ct. 1904 , 1909 The sixth amendment similarly is unavailable to address the limiting instruction problem where state law excludes a statement that it could have admitted consonant with the Confrontation Clause. Thus, courts should use a procedural fairness rationale to reach situations where the limiting instruction procedure is inadequate to assure fairness even though the sixth amendment confrontation guarantee is satisfied. 14 7
If the authors are correct in concluding that confrontation analysis cannot mandate severance to protect a defendant against the possible use of a codefendant's confession against him where the Confrontation Clause would allow the court to admit such confession against the defendant, and if courts do not substitute a fairness basis for the confrontation rationale, a revolution will occur in consideration of Bruton claims, at least in jurisdictions which recognize no declaration against interest hearsay exception.
We envision a situation where, before granting severance under Bruton in any codefendant confession case in which domestic law excludes the codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant, the judge will have to determine whether the Confrontation Clause hypothetically would have allowed such use. This process will involve a complicated case-by-case reliability analysis of the type the Supreme Court has gone great lengths to avoid in decisions like Bourjaily v. United States. 148 Even if prosecutors do not often ultimately succeed in convincing courts that the Confrontation Clause would have permitted use of the codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant, their efforts will consume extensive 145 406 U.S. at 690. 146 Perhaps, if the use of counsel provides the appropriate solution to problems of misidentification, the Supreme Court should have found in the general language of the fifth and fourteenth amendment due process clauses a right to counsel that extended even to many pre-trial identification procedures not governed by the counsel clause of the sixth amendment. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) , finding, in the fifth amendment, a right to counsel that sometimes attaches sooner than does the sixth amendment right to counsel. 147 See Haddad, supra note 6, at 33. It bears repeating that George Henry Bruton did not make a confrontation claim at any stage of the litigation. The United States Supreme Court opinion in Bruton thus relied upon a constitutional provision not once cited by the prevailing party.
148 483 U. S. 171 (1987) . Boudaily held that the Confrontation Clause is automatically satisfied where a statement falls within a "well-rooted" hearsay exception, thus obviating a need for a reliability analysis of the particular statement. Id. at 184. time and energy of both the trial and reviewing courts. 49 Under a procedural fairness approach, by contrast, courts will not be required to make such decisions. Once domestic law mandates exclusion of the codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant, it will be irrelevant to the severance issue whether the Confrontation Clause would have prohibited use of the codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant.
IV. CONCLUSION
Jurisdictions which have made a policy judgment banning the use of inculpatory third-party declarations against penal interest should not permit that judgment to be undermined by the use of the kind of limiting instruction procedure condemned in Bruton. However, where the Confrontation Clause would permit use of a codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant, courts cannot properly interpret the Confrontation Clause as prohibiting use of the joint trial-limiting instruction procedure. Accordingly, those jurisdictions should invoke a procedural fairness rationale for requiring severance absent some other means of satisfying the concerns expressed in Bruton.
150
149 The authors believe that often prosecutors will convince courts of the reliability of third-party inculpatory declarations against interest. See supra note 83.
150 We refer to redaction or other means of complying with Bruton. See supra note 87.
